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Three reasons Kyiv’s innovative invasion puts Putin’s regime on notice

Ukraine’s surprise attack on Russian soil may be short-lived but its value in the long term may be significant

Given Ukraine’s repeated demonstration of its ability to adapt and innovate over the two-and-a-half years since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, its breathtaking cross-border strike perhaps shouldn’t have been so surprising.
We have watched as, with seemingly boundless enthusiasm and determination, Kyiv’s troops – and the wider society that largely comprises this civilian-in-uniform army – have shown their ability to field and support the most sophisticated military hardware external allies can provide.
Even so, the scale of the imagination, preparation and execution needed to launch the first invasion of Russia since the Second World War has caught most observers unaware.
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Of course, the observer caught most unaware, and with most to lose from Kyiv’s latest adaptation, is Vladimir Putin.
Already the incursion has sent the value of the ruble spiralling. He will be more concerned, however, for the three other reasons this Ukrainian assault could similarly impact his position at the top of the foetid system he has created.
First, unlike other border incursions by pro-Ukrainian outfits such as the Freedom of Russia Legion that seem more designed to grab quick headlines and selfies, this attack has done actual military harm to Putin.
Like all autocrats, a large part of his power is drawn from the idea that for all his myriad ills (which will be known, but selectively ignored by many out of self-preservation) he is best equipped to provide security; to keep the barbarians from the gates.
This Ukrainian seizure of around 1,000 square kilometres of Russian soil will dent that image. That is an outcome dictators can seldom survive if repeated.
So, not only will Putin insist Kyiv’s troops are forced off every inch of Russian territory, but he will also demand – possibly with a few senior sackings here and there (Gen Valery Gerasimov, the head of Russia’s armed forces, is looking very vulnerable right now, having insisted after the initial incursion last Tuesday that everything was under control) – that no such episode ever happen again.
That gives Ukraine an edge to exploit and leads to the second thing Putin will fear.
A quick review of last week: Ukraine barged their way over the border through a clever combination of military tactics. They concentrated and focused their limited electronic warfare assets on blinding Russian reconnaissance drones and interfering with the radio networks that are vital in bringing order to the chaos of the battlefield.
Next, they pushed tanks and other armoured vehicles through this electromagnetic “black hole”, with their path cleared of enemy units by Kyiv’s own attack drones, operating in a similar fashion to the RAF’s Hawker Hurricane or US Mustang tank-busting aircraft in the Second World War.
Such tactics – and the surprise with which they were delivered – may not last for weeks, but they don’t have to; they have proven such things can be done. Therefore, if it can be done north-east of Sumy, why not elsewhere, at a time and place of Ukraine’s choosing?
In this way, Kyiv’s land forces can act in a similar way to a maritime strike force that has the ability to range up and down a coastline, the enemy never certain exactly when and where it will hit next.
Suppose next month, Russian troops on the border of Kharkiv oblast suddenly report a massive electronic warfare and drone attack similar to last week’s. Should they ignore it, or rush additional forces to the area in case of another Ukrainian border incursion?
What a very economical way for Ukraine to keep Russia guessing.
In all likelihood, it will force Russia to divert some assets from elsewhere, whilst minimising their own exposure to danger. There is some evidence already of Russian military units being taken from the Kharkiv and Kherson fronts to bolster the defence of Kursk. After all, Putin can’t allow any of the Motherland to be held by Kyiv, as earlier discussed.
In this way, Russian air defence, electronic warfare and anti-tank weapons may have to be redeployed back into Russia, not to mention the personnel to use them – the conscripts and Rosgvardia (a type of internal national guard) standing on the border won’t be sufficiently trained.
The third reason for Putin to worry is that Ukraine has shown the ability to employ a combined arms manoeuvre, whereby all the parts of the military orchestra – the tanks, infantry, engineers, and so on – can be made to operate in tune with each other and not descend into a mess.
This will give confidence not only to Kyiv’s forces and the folks back home, but also to the Western backers who can see a return on their investment of military hardware having been shown that this Russian army can be beaten in the field.
Then, against an increasingly loud backdrop of calls for negotiations, Ukraine may, like an Olympic sprinter deciding when best to turn on the gas for the final charge, plan another border incursion, in order to be sitting on a chunk of Russian land just as the ceasefire is called, thereby strengthening their bargaining hand.
The loss of ground in Russia’s southern border region may be limited and temporary, for now at least.
But the longer Ukraine’s forces are there, the greater the peril for the man who thought, 900 days ago, that he’d be in Kyiv in 72 hours.

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